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The problem of relating law to psychiatry and other behavior sciences
is epitomized by the difficulties, on the one hand, of applying the archaic
McNaghton rules on insanity in the modern criminal court and, on
the other, of applying the common notion that all delinquents and
criminals are emotionally sick people. These conflicting ideas point
up very acutely the need in contemporary criminology to improve the
integration of the sciences of human behavior with the reasonable and
realistic operation of our criminal courts and correctional system. To
that end we must exploit the skills of the biological and social sciences
more fully, but we must also better adapt the techniques of these fields
to the goals of criminal law, insofar as they may serve the administra-
tion of justice. Much of the problem of relating law to the clinical
fields lies in the need to clarify the functions and objectives of each,
to recognize the differences in their orientations, and to arrive at an
effective coordination of them.
Putting it simply, it appears that the behavior sciences are concerned
primarily with the problems of maladjustment and emotional illness,
while the criminal law aims basically to provide for the security of
the community and its citizens. The former, therefore, looks to the
diagnosis and therapy of pathologies in the individual; there is no direct
concern with conforming the individual's conduct to standards of law
and morality. The clinician, by his training and philosophy, is more
concerned with the individual than the mass, with the protection of
the patient rather than the community. In contrast with this orienta-
tion, the function of the criminal law is to protect society against the
invasion of the citizen's rights rather than to resolve problems of social
welfare or of public health. While these objectives of law and behavior
science are not uniformly and intrinsically inconsistent, neither are they
always entirely compatible.
Criminal justice is concerned in its utilization of clinical knowledge
and personnel that there be a large consensus among the behavior
experts on basic matters of diagnosis and treatment of criminal devia-
tions if their theories are to be introduced into criminal procedures
and correctional methods. Justice also requires that the public be pro-
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tected even if the consequence is not ide'ally suited to the clinical require-
ments of the offender. Where diagnosis is required by the court and
where therapy is employed in the correctional system, the major objec-
tive is the prevention of future crime. And to justify expenditures for
clinical diagnosis and treatment, it must be reasonably economical in
time and expense, particularly as to minor offenders whose threat to the
community is not great.
The criminologist is generally hesitant today to establish a strictly
clinical orientation in the treatment of most offenders. He is skeptical
particularly concerning the application of medical psychology to the
great mass of what appear to be psychologically normal criminals or to
"emotionally deviated," "psychopathic" or neurotic offenders where
their conditions are not amenable to reasonably effective treatment
modalities nor even to uniform diagnoses among the experts. In addi-
tion he is (or should be) concerned that a thoroughly individualized
and clinical orientation in our courts and correctional system may too
far dilute the deterrent value of the law in its impact upon the whole
community. The notion, increasingly popular in some quarters of con-
temporary criminology, that all criminals are products of "emotional
illness" requiring extensive analytic investigation and intensive clinical
therapy appears-at least at the present state of our knowledge and
tools-to lack the vindicative evidence that would be necessary to
support a system of clinical justice. More resources for the under-
standing and the effective treatment of the criminal we do surely need,
but these cannot soundly be predicated upon narrow, sectarian, and
inadequately tested hypotheses concerning etiology or therapy!
[Vol. 49
